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“The question here is the consistency of state action with the Fed-
eral Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided, 
by a political branch of government coequal with this Court.”1 
“To charge courts with the task of accommodating the incommen-
surable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles 
is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his autobiography, Chief Justice Earl Warren described Baker v. 
Carr3 as “the most important case of [his] tenure on the Court.”4 Follow-
ing Brown v. Board of Education5 by eight years, Baker was the second 
“blockbuster” case of the Warren Court.6 Warren felt that, if the progeny 
of Baker had preceded Brown, Brown would have been unnecessary.7 The 
Baker case would become one of “the most crucial ever taken up”8 by the 
U.S. Supreme Court and “would forever change the nature of politics in 
the United States.”9 
Before 1960, the Supreme Court rarely had shown concern for the 
electoral and legislative processes,10 instead choosing to stay out of “this 
political thicket,”11 and the country had continued to suffer from problems 
related to these processes. At the time of Baker, almost all state legisla-
tures were malapportioned.12 Many state legislators refused to reapportion 
their districts, and most legislatures were “backwater relics of past politi-
cal deals.”13 Often lawmakers came from rural areas and frustrated the 
  
 1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J., writing for the Court). 
 2. Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 3. See generally id. at 186. 
 4. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977). 
 5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 6. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 199 (2000). 
 7. See John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974). Ely clerked for Earl Warren. 
Id. at 11. 
 8. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 379 (1997). 
 9. KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS 
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 175 (1993). 
 10. ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
REFORM 114 (1968). 
 11. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). 
 12. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequenc-
es, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105 (2000). Delegations to the House of Representatives suf-
fered from malapportionment, too. Id. 
 13. Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in 
REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 219 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz 
 
2013] Instrumentalist and Holmesian Voices 3 
interests of voters in the cities and suburbs, particularly with regard to 
civil rights.14 By 1960, the U.S. population had become much more urban 
than it had been at the beginning of the twentieth century.15 In 1900, 
39.6% of people in the United States lived in urban areas, but, by 1960, 
63.1% lived in urban areas.16 A 1961 University of Virginia study indicat-
ed that across the country urban voters had less than half of the representa-
tion of rural voters.17 In Florida, one of the most poorly apportioned 
states, approximately nineteen percent of the population controlled the 
majority in the state legislature.18 After the 1950 census, the 15,000 resi-
dents of three rural counties in Northern California had the same represen-
tation in the state senate as the 7,000,000 residents in Los Angeles Coun-
ty.19 To make matters worse, the drawing up of districts often involved 
racial gerrymandering.20 
By the 1950s, voters in Tennessee had given up appealing to the 
members of their legislature for voting reform.21 With the population 
growth in urban areas, rural white voters had more political say than ur-
ban black voters.22 Voters in some Tennessee counties had eight, ten, or 
twenty times as much representation as voters in other counties.23 Alt-
hough the Tennessee Constitution had required the legislature to draw dis-
trict boundaries based on population,24 the rural legislators who held the 
power had no incentive to act.25 Unfortunately for the urban voters, no 
mechanism for judicial enforcement of reapportionment existed in state 
court.26 In light of a “crazy quilt”27 of legislative districts, systematic in 
nature,28 that was in place, some Tennessee voters eventually turned to the 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, for justice.29  
With its decisions in Baker and the ensuing cases, the Supreme Court 
“sent an earthquake through a political system that was already being 
  
& Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997).  
 14. Id. 
 15. McConnell, supra note 12, at 104-05. 
 16. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 4 - Population: 1790 to 1990 (Aug. 1993), 
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf. 
 17. CRAY, supra note 8, at 380. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 381. Earl Warren eventually recognized how malapportioned his home state of Califor-
nia was. WARREN, supra note 4, at 309-10. 
 20. CRAY, supra note 8, at 381. 
 21. JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 388 (2006). 
 22. Id. 
 23. COX, supra note 10, at 115. 
 24. McConnell, supra note 12, at 104. 
 25. Id. at 105. 
 26. Id. at 104. 
 27. Baker, 369 U.S. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 28. McConnell, supra note 12, at 105. 
 29. See NEWTON, supra note 21, at 388. 
6
4 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 4 
tossed and turned in so many directions”30 and began the process of put-
ting an end to rural domination of state legislatures.31 Baker itself was a 
major step down the road toward the idea of “one person, one vote,”32 
which the Court would articulate for the first time a year later in Gray v. 
Sanders.33 In Reynolds v. Sims, only two years after Baker, Chief Justice 
Warren would observe, “Legislators represent people, not trees or 
acres.”34 The resulting “reapportionment revolution”35 of Baker and its 
progeny would bring attention to urban voters and their problems.36  
Unlike cases such as Brown v. Board of Education37 that triggered re-
sistance, Baker triggered a paradigm shift in reapportionment that has been 
widely popular.38 The public greatly favored the decision.39 Indeed, the 
  
 30. Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of One Person, 
One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1351 (2002). The 
turbulent era of Baker and progeny included the assassination of President John Kennedy, the civil 
rights movement, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Vietnam War, the 1968 
presidential election, and other major occurrences. Id. at 1306. 
 31. POWE, supra note 6, at 203. 
 32. For a discussion of the meaning of this now-famous phrase, see generally Sanford Levinson, 
One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002). 
 33. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (considering, in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Georgia’s county unit system of nominating officials). 
 34. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (considering, in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, malapportionment of both houses of the Alabama Legislature). For the Court’s 
treatment of Georgia’s apportionment of votes for the U.S. House of Representatives, see Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), which used the command of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution that 
congressional representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States.” 
 35. See generally GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, 
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966). 
 36. POWE, supra note 6, at 203. In bringing attention to urban voters, the Court arguably nega-
tively impacted local communities, both urban and rural. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote 
and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1239-43 (2002). Some political 
theory helps to explain this point. Liberal theories of politics suggest that the individual enters politics 
to gain the ends that he or she seeks and may join groups to achieve those ends. Id. at 1240. In con-
trast, communitarian and civic republican theories of politics suggest that the individual exists within a 
meaningful political community and that membership within that community is part of self-identity, 
rather than a means to an end. Id. at 1240-41. Liberal theories reflect a thinner view of representative 
democracy than communitarian and civil republican theories. Id. at 1240. The Court’s focus on one 
person, one vote after Baker, oriented more toward numbers rather than pre-existing local groups, was 
more commensurate with a liberal theory of politics. See id. at 1241-43. However, given various 
nationally-oriented forces in the United States such as media organizations and other business entities, 
the shrinking of localism may have been inevitable. See id. at 1261-64. Regardless, simple, homoge-
neous communities are no longer the norm. See BAKER, supra note 35, at 102. 
 37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 38. Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 207. See also POWE, supra note 6, at 203; Heather K. 
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1412-13 (2002). Of course, not everyone supported the decision. Several con-
gressmen from the South were especially critical. BAKER, supra note 35, at 7. For example, Senator 
Richard B. Russell of Georgia described the decision as “‘another major assault on our constitutional 
system.’” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT – A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 426 (1983). 
 39. Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of 
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1380 (1987). However, not all academics viewed the decision so 
favorably. Id. 
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public understood the concept of representative democracy40 and, in the 
years after Baker, was eager to use, and did use, the federal courts to 
challenge districting schemes.41 Recognizing the potential of Baker for 
addressing the problems of urban areas, the Kennedy Administration sup-
ported the decision.42 At his first press conference after the Court an-
nounced the decision, President John Kennedy observed, “‘The right to 
fair representation and to have each vote count equally is, it seems to me, 
basic to the successful operation of a democracy.’”43 Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy called the decision “‘a landmark in the development of 
representative government.’”44 
Not only was the case popular, but it was a judicial success as well.45 
In the early 1960s, the legislative bodies of forty-eight states had popula-
tion variances between the size of the smallest and largest districts in a 
given state of over fifteen percent.46 After reapportionment and the 1970 
census, merely fourteen states had this type of population variance.47 All 
but three states reapportioned their legislatures, and nineteen states redrew 
the lines for their congressional districts.48 Within several years of Baker 
and its progeny, almost all legislative institutions in the United States had 
reorganized themselves to comply with the new case law.49  
Indeed, some of the work toward fairer reapportionment began soon 
after Baker. Hours after the announcement of the Baker decision, attor-
neys filed a redistricting lawsuit in Georgia.50 Several days later, attorneys 
filed a similar suit in Alabama.51 Within one year of Baker, citizens in 
over thirty states challenged malapportioned districts,52 and within four 
years of the case, citizens in forty-six states challenged malapportioned 
districts.53  
As with other major Supreme Court cases, Baker featured rhetoric 
from highly influential justices, two of whom in this case were Justice 
William Brennan and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Brennan would 
write the groundbreaking opinion for the Court that would be part of “the 
  
 40. POWE, supra note 6, at 203. 
 41. See DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: THE 
LAW AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 30 (1997).  
 42. POWE, supra note 6, at 204. 
 43. Id. 
 44. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 425. 
 45. Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 207; Gerken, supra note 38, at 1412. 
 46. Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 211. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1301. Such line redrawing did not prevent those in 
charge of creating districts from drawing the lines in their own favor. Id. at 1351. Partisan gerryman-
dering has continued to occur decennially. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1301. 
 50. CRAY, supra note 8, at 384. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 36 (1997). 
 53. Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1301. 
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critical mass of the Brennan legacy.”54 Decades later, a noted conservative 
on the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia, would describe the progres-
sive Brennan as “probably the most influential justice of the [twentieth] 
century.”55 Justice Frankfurter would write a scathing dissent that would 
defend the status quo staunchly.56 Frankfurter, a former professor at Har-
vard Law School, arguably “was the most qualified [Supreme Court] ap-
pointee of the [twentieth] century.”57 
Although the case contained various opinions, the opinions of Brennan 
and Frankfurter were particularly important, especially because of how 
well they contrasted the respective judicial philosophies of their authors. 
Brennan’s instrumentalist philosophy in the majority opinion looked to use 
the federal courts to promote justice for urban voters, while Frankfurter’s 
Holmesian philosophy in a lengthy dissent aimed to pass the problem of 
fair representation along to Congress for resolution. 
This Article takes a retrospective look at how the two differing judicial 
philosophies of Brennan and Frankfurter, instrumentalist and Holmesian in 
nature, vied to influence the outcome of Baker v. Carr, one of the most 
important Supreme Court cases of the twentieth century. To do so, the 
Article initially will provide an overview of four major judicial philoso-
phies, including instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and natural 
law. Consideration of all four judicial philosophies will provide for a more 
thorough understanding of instrumentalism and Holmesianism. Next, the 
Article will offer background on the Baker case. After offering back-
ground on the case, the Article will identify the various philosophical in-
gredients at work in the opinions of Brennan and Frankfurter. Finally, the 
Article will make some observations regarding the judicial philosophies at 
work in the two main opinions in Baker. 
II.  JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES 
Prior legal scholarship has identified four major judicial philosophies. 
Such philosophies include instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and 
natural law.58 As noted above, although instrumentalism and 
  
 54. Justice Brennan Remembered – Part 1, PBS NEWSHOUR, July 24, 1997, available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec97/brennan_7-24.html (comments of Joshua Rosenkranz). 
 55. Justice Brennan Remembered – Part 2, PBS NEWSHOUR, July 24, 1997, available at http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec97/brennan_7-24a.html.  
 56. Shortly after the decision in the case, Frankfurter sent a note to Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
in which Frankfurter said that the Court’s majority had not “‘appreciate[d] the intrinsic and acquired 
majesty of the Court’s significance in the affairs of the country.’” THE SUPREME COURT IN 
CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 851-52 n.71 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
 57. POWE, supra note 6, at 6. 
 58. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The 
State of the Debate, Circa 2009, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 351, 352 (2010). 
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Holmesianism are the two approaches that will inform the analysis in the 
present Article, this section of the Article will provide an overview of all 
four approaches to judicial decision-making to explain instrumentalism and 
Holmesianism in contrast to the other approaches. 
A.  Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism is a judicial philosophy that is concerned with re-
sults.59 Instrumentalist judges see law as a means to an end.60 They believe 
that law advances moral concepts and that, through their work, judges 
help achieve justice.61 Such judges are willing to consider social policy, 
especially when leeway in the law exists.62 For instance, no pre-existing 
law may cover the specific situation at hand, ambiguities in the applicable 
law may exist, or several rules of law arguably could apply in one case.63 
Contrasted with Holmesian judges, instrumentalist judges are less like-
ly to defer to other branches of government.64 Instrumentalists see the 
court system as a “co-equal third branch” of the government and reject the 
idea that judges only should strike down legislation that clearly violates the 
Constitution.65 In assuming a role in formulating public policy, instrumen-
talist judges are comfortable with devising tests of their own because such 
tests offer more flexibility in addressing the facts of a particular case.66 
When explicitly formulating and evaluating rules of law, instrumentalists 
are concerned that the rules have specific purposes, so when the purpose 
for a rule is gone, the rule should no longer persist.67 Social purpose, not 
pure logic, is the key.68 
Instrumentalists make broadly-based historical investigations to come 
to their legal conclusions.69 They look at both text and context.70 They do 
not allow stare decisis to control when they feel that prior law is wrong for 
the present time.71 Consequently, they see the Constitution as an evolving 
document.72 On this note, Brennan observed, “For the genius of the Con-
  
 59. See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court Is Dealing with Prece-
dents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 980 (1996). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to 
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 213 (1994). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 215. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 980. 
 67. See Kelso, supra note 62, at 214. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 216. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 217. 
 72. Id. 
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stitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is 
dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with 
current problems and current needs.”73 
Instrumentalism was especially popular during the Warren Court era 
of the 1950s and 1960s.74 Besides Brennan, instrumentalists of that era 
included Chief Justice Earl Warren, as well as Justices William Douglas, 
Thurgood Marshall, and Abe Fortas.75 More recently, Justice John Paul 
Stevens also adopted an instrumentalist approach.76 
B.  Holmesianism  
Named after Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Holmesianism is a judi-
cial philosophy that favors settled law and deference to the other branches 
of government.77 Holmesian judges like predictable rules and predictable 
treatment of existing law.78 When the law is well-established, they general-
ly follow precedent.79 Holmesian judges prefer rules with sharp corners to 
balancing tests.80 Such judges are sensitive to the purposes behind legal 
rules, including the general intent of the Framers,81 and thus are inclined 
to go beyond the literal meanings of words,82 often considering history as 
context for rules.83  
Holmesian judges tend not to like purely mechanically-applied legal 
rules.84 As Holmes himself wrote, “[A] page of history is worth a volume 
of logic.”85 Decades earlier, before he was on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Holmes had observed, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”86 To that claim, he had added, “The law embodies the story 
of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt 
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of math-
ematics.”87 
According to Holmesian judges, the judicial role is to interpret exist-
ing law. Any changes in the law should come from the other branches of 
  
 73. William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985). 
 74. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 981. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 978-79. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 984-85. 
 80. Id. at 978-79. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Kelso, supra note 62, at 196. 
 83. Id. at 198. 
 84. See id. at 195. 
 85. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 86. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown and Company 1923) 
(1881).  
 87. Id. 
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government.88 Most frequently, Holmesian judges caution judicial re-
straint.89 Consequently, Holmesian judges generally defer to the govern-
ment in constitutional cases.90 
Besides its use when Holmes was on the U.S. Supreme Court from 
1902 until 1932,91 a Holmesian approach was popular in the years after 
1937 and prior to the advent of the Warren Court in the 1950s.92 In more 
recent years, Chief Justice William Rehnquist exemplified Holmesian de-
cision-making.93  
C.  Formalism 
Formalist judges attempt to draw a distinction between law and mo-
rality.94 The judge is not supposed to be concerned with obtaining a just 
result in a given case.95 Rather, the judge is to mechanically apply legal 
rules to factual circumstances.96 Although formalism adopts the position 
that legal process should be free of values,97 formalism gravitates toward 
values such as certainty and predictability.98 
In constitutional interpretation, formalists focus on literal meanings of 
words and the specific intents of Framers and Ratifiers, but not on purpose 
or general intent.99 Such judges rarely place much emphasis on context,100 
and they avoid broadly-based historical inquiry.101 They also shy away 
from reasoned elaboration of legal concepts over time.102 Formalists prefer 
“bright-line rules” to balancing tests.103  
Regardless of the theoretical dissonance that doing so creates, formal-
ists sometimes will look beyond sources contemporaneous with a rule of 
law and identify a subsequent tradition.104 They will consider a consistent 
legislative or executive practice as evidence of a clear tradition, and the 
result is a gloss on the meaning of the text.105 Despite this theoretical ir-
  
 88. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 979. 
 89. Kelso, supra note 62, at 197. 
 90. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 979. 
 91. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 384 (1993). 
 92. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 980. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 977. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM 
TO CRITICAL THEORY 39 (2d ed. 2005). 
 98. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978. 
 99. Id. at 977-78. 
100. Kelso, supra note 62, at 185. 
101. See id. at 185-86. 
102. See id. 
103. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978. 
104. Kelso, supra note 62, at 186. 
105. Id. 
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regularity, formalists do not allow an identified tradition to trump a clear 
mandate in the Constitution.106 
Formalism was a popular approach to judicial decision-making be-
tween 1872 and 1937.107 More recently, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clar-
ence Thomas have adopted a formalist approach to their work on the 
bench.108 
D.  Natural Law 
Natural law judges draw upon strands of formalism and instrumental-
ism.109 Like formalist judges, natural law judges see law as a set of princi-
ples, but like instrumentalist judges, natural law judges apply moral con-
cepts to legal decision-making.110 Indeed, natural law judges elaborate on 
the moral concepts in the Constitution.111 Such judges follow a social con-
tract as established in the Constitution.112  
Purpose is important to natural law judges.113 Context and history are 
also important.114 Natural law judges respect reasoned elaboration of legal 
precedents as well as legislative and executive practices as glosses on tex-
tual meanings.115 
A natural law approach to decision-making was popular in the United 
States from 1789 until 1872.116 Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice 
Joseph Story exemplified an early natural law perspective.117 In more re-
cent years, Justices Sandra O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy have revived 
the natural law perspective. 118  
III.  BACKGROUND ON BAKER V. CARR 
The factual background that the justices on the Supreme Court encoun-
tered in Baker constituted “a classic lockout scenario.”119 Charles W. 
Baker and nine other plaintiffs, all of whom were Tennessee residents who 
lived in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, claimed that, 
  
106. Id. 
107. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978. 
108. Id. 




113. Kelso, supra note 62, at 150-52. 
114. Id. at 153-54. 
115. Id. at 157-58. 
116. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 983. 
117. Kelso, supra note 62, at 152. 
118. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 983. 
119. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation” 
and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 556 (2003). 
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because of a population shift and the lack of legislative reapportionment 
since 1901, the plaintiffs were suffering from dilution of their votes for the 
Tennessee Legislature.120 In 1901, the state’s population had been 
2,020,616 with 487,380 individuals eligible to vote.121 In 1960, the state’s 
population was 3,567,089 with 2,092,891 individuals eligible to vote.122 
Between 1901 and 1960, the relative standings of the counties with regard 
to individuals qualified to vote had changed substantially too.123 At the 
time of Baker, forty percent of the voters elected sixty of ninety-nine 
members of the Tennessee House, while thirty-seven percent of the voters 
elected twenty of thirty-three members of the Tennessee Senate.124 The 
mayor of Nashville had commented that “‘the hog lot and the cow pas-
ture’” governed the state.125 The Plaintiffs sued Tennessee Secretary of 
State Joseph Carr and other state officials in federal court under Sections 
1983 and 1988 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, claiming that Tennessee’s 
1901 Apportionment Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.126  
The federal district court dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.127 The lower court believed that the Supreme Court’s 
then-recent case of Colegrove v. Green128 was controlling precedent in the 
current case.129 Frankfurter had written the plurality opinion in 
Colegrove.130 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Baker case. The Court’s 
agreeing to hear the case after having rejected a prior challenge to the 
same malapportioned Tennessee Legislature in 1956 was ironic. In a per 
curiam opinion in Kidd v. McCanless,131 which had come from the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court,132 the U.S. Supreme Court had cited Colegrove as 
grounds for dismissal.133 
On April 19 and 20, 1961, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in 
the new Tennessee case.134 At the conference that followed oral argument, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and 
  
120. Baker, 369 U.S. at 192-94; CRAY, supra note 8, at 379; POWE, supra note 6, at 200. 
121. Baker, 369 U.S. at 192. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring). 
125. CRAY, supra note 8, at 379. 
126. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88, 192, 205. 
127. Id. at 196. 
128. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
129. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 410. 
130. Id. 
131. See generally 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam). 
132. See generally Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956). 
133. See Kidd, 352 U.S. at 920. 
134. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186. 
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William Brennan all agreed that federal jurisdiction was appropriate and 
that a cause of action existed.135 Frankfurter strongly opposed these justic-
es, unleashing “‘a brilliant tour de force . . . speaking at considerable 
length, pulling down reports and reading from them, and powerfully argu-
ing the correctness of Colegrove,’” as Brennan later recalled.136 Frankfur-
ter’s performance, in which he presented a parade of horribles that would 
ensue if the Court entered the apportionment arena,137 lasted between one-
and-a-half and two hours.138 Both Justices Tom Clark and John Marshall 
Harlan agreed with Frankfurter.139 Since he thought that a bare majority 
was insufficient to abandon Colegrove, Justice Charles Whittaker would 
vote with Frankfurter.140 Justice Potter Stewart, the key fifth vote for a 
Warren group majority, was critical of the Colegrove precedent, but he 
did not think the plaintiffs could successfully make a claim on the merits 
for equal protection.141 Because Stewart could not make up his mind, the 
case was put off for reargument until the next term.142  
Reargument took place on October 9, 1961.143 During the second 
round of oral argument, Warren asked Tennessee Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jack Wilson whether the plaintiffs had a remedy for their problem in 
the courts of Tennessee.144 Wilson answered that the plaintiffs did not have 
any remedy at all in state court.145 This candid response caught the atten-
tion of Stewart.146 
Almost immediately after the reargument, Frankfurter circulated a 
memorandum among the Brethren, arguing for his position against taking 
the case.147 This memorandum, sixty pages in length, was almost the same 
as the dissenting opinion that he would publish.148 Brennan responded by 
circulating his own memorandum with an attached chart that illustrated the 
problem of vote dilution among different counties in Tennessee.149 
At the conference that followed reargument, Stewart made known his 
intent to vote with the Warren group.150 Although worried about federal 
court intervention in the area of apportionment,151 Stewart had become 
  
135. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 412. 
136. CRAY, supra note 8, at 381. 
137. Lewis, supra note 52, at 31. 
138. Id. at 30; EISLER, supra note 9, at 171. 
139. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 412. 
140. Id. 
141. See Lewis, supra note 52, at 31. 
142. POWE, supra note 6, at 201.  
143. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186. 
144. CRAY, supra note 8, at 381. 
145. Id. at 382. 
146. Id. 
147. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 413. 
148. Lewis, supra note 52, at 31. 
149. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 413-14. 
150. Id. at 415. 
151. CRAY, supra note 8, at 382. 
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concerned that the Tennessee malapportionment was so extreme as to be 
irrational, and he felt that federal district court jurisdiction was appropri-
ate.152 However, Stewart would agree to support jurisdiction only; he did 
not want to address the merits of the case.153 Warren now had the five 
votes necessary for an opinion that jurisdiction was appropriate. 
When it came time to write the Court’s opinion, Warren, having pre-
viously contemplated writing the opinion himself, consulted Black and 
Douglas and then assigned the opinion to Brennan.154 The decision to as-
sign the opinion to Brennan had taken Warren ten days to make after the 
conference that followed reargument.155 The assignment was somewhat 
ironic because, in the early 1960s, Brennan, one of the three newest jus-
tices on the Court, was still relatively unknown.156 Nonetheless, Brennan, 
“a judicial craftsman,”157 had the best chance of retaining Stewart’s 
vote.158 Brennan had his work cut out for him. Not only did Brennan have 
the task of writing an opinion that would keep together a majority of the 
Court,159 but he also had to write an opinion that would withstand the rhe-
torical assault of an incensed Frankfurter, Brennan’s former law profes-
sor.160 By the time the Court heard Baker, Frankfurter was no longer able 
to agree with his opponents at all.161  
During late 1961 and early 1962, Brennan circulated various drafts of 
an opinion, attempting to please both Stewart, who wanted a narrow opin-
ion, and Douglas, who wanted a sweeping opinion.162 In January 1962, 
Stewart indicated that he would sign Brennan’s opinion.163 In preparing to 
write a dissent, Clark mysteriously wanted to consult Brennan’s 
malapportionment chart again.164 When Clark realized that the voters of 
Tennessee had no other recourse for their problem besides the federal 
  
152. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 417. 
153. See id. at 417-18. 
154. NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390; CRAY, supra note 8, at 382.  
155. Lewis, supra note 52, at 32. 
156. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
157. CRAY, supra note 8, at 382. 
158. POWE, supra note 6, at 499. 
159. Brennan joked that a key talent for a member of the Court was an ability to count to five. 
Lewis, supra note 52, at 32. 
160. NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390. Frankfurter had an over-blown self-image that was vital to 
his sense of well-being. H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 5 (1981). The justice 
could not accept opposition in areas in which he felt he had expertise, and he responded to such oppo-
sition with hostility. Id. at 5-6. When Stewart eventually sided with Brennan, Frankfurter told his law 
clerks, “‘This is the darkest day in the history of the Court.’” CRAY, supra note 8, at 382. 
161. HIRSCH, supra note 160, at 198. By 1962, Frankfurter, then “old and ill,” was more interested 
in his legacy. Id. 
162. NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390. 
163. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 419. 
164. Lewis, supra note 52, at 34-35. 
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courts, he changed his mind, siding with the Warren group on both juris-
diction and the merits.165  
After Clark switched his vote to join Brennan, Brennan had five votes 
for both reversal on jurisdiction and a decision on the merits.166 However, 
Warren wanted to respect Stewart’s wishes against a decision on the mer-
its, and Brennan wanted to keep his promise to Stewart regarding a narrow 
opinion.167 In the end, Brennan would limit the decision to jurisdiction.168 
On March 26, 1962, Brennan issued an opinion for the Court that six 
justices signed.169 The Supreme Court held that the lower court’s dismissal 
was in error and remanded the case to the lower court for purposes of 
trial.170 Douglas, Clark, and Stewart issued concurring opinions;171 Frank-
furter and Harlan issued dissents.172 Frankfurter was especially upset.173 
Given his poor health,174 Whittaker ultimately did not vote in the case.175 
With their six opinions, the participating justices produced 165 pages of 
rhetoric for the reporters.176 
As the opinions of the day were read from the bench, Warren, no 
doubt quite pleased that his group had held together a majority, wrote a 
note to Brennan that said, “‘It is a great day for the Irish.’”177 Then, be-
fore passing along the note, Warren replaced the word Irish with the word 
country.178 
IV.  JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AT WORK IN THE OPINIONS OF BRENNAN 
AND FRANKFURTER 
This section of the Article looks at how judicial philosophies played 
out in Brennan’s opinion for the Court and Frankfurter’s dissent. The sec-
tion will illustrate Brennan’s instrumentalist approach and Frankfurter’s 
Holmesian approach. 
  
165. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 422-23. 
166. Id. at 419.  
167. Id.; EISLER, supra note 9, at 175.  
168. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 418-19. 
169. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186-87. 
170. Id. at 188.  
171. See id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring), 251 (Clark, J., concurring), 265 (Stewart, J.,  con-
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A.  Brennan’s Opinion As Instrumentalist 
Brennan’s opinion demonstrated a strong instrumentalist approach to 
decision-making. Because the author of an opinion for the Court must 
maintain a majority, an opinion for the Court is often not as pure a state-
ment of the author’s philosophy as is a concurrence or dissent, but Bren-
nan’s opinion in Baker still made a clear instrumentalist statement. In his 
opinion, Brennan treated law as a means to an end, used law to advance 
moral concepts, employed the court system to help achieve justice, re-
frained from deferring to other branches of the government, adopted a 
judicially-created test, and saw the Constitution as an evolving document. 
This subsection elaborates on the various instrumentalist ingredients in 
Brennan’s opinion. 
First, Brennan’s opinion viewed law as a means to an end, and the end 
was promoting equal voting rights for urban voters. Brennan used various 
legal doctrines to further the end that he and the majority desired. For 
instance, he determined that, under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion, the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the representa-
tion controversy.179 The matter had “‘arise[n] under’” the Constitution 
because the matter involved an alleged violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Therefore, Congress could give 
the district courts subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, and 
Congress did so in Section 1343(3) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.181 
Additionally, Brennan found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring 
their lawsuit.182 He determined that the plaintiffs had sued to vindicate 
their interest regarding an ability to vote and that they had sued the appro-
priate officials, including the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Attorney 
General, the Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of 
Elections, who allegedly could be held responsible for the vote dilution.183 
The plaintiffs were “asserting ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in 
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.’”184 
Furthermore, Brennan worked with precedent in addressing the poten-
tial problem of the political question doctrine.185 He argued that Colegrove 
  
179. Baker, 369 U.S. at 199. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 200. 
182. Id. at 206.  
183. See id. at 205-08.  
184. Id. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)). 
185. The term political question is a misnomer because the federal courts address matters related to 
politics. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 131 (4th ed. 
2011). See generally, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (determining that President 
Richard Nixon had to comply with a subpoena for tapes of presidential conversations sought as evi-
dence in a criminal trial). 
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v. Green,186 a key precedent for the argument in favor of the political 
question bar to allowing a federal court to hear the case, had been misin-
terpreted by the district court because the current case was about the Equal 
Protection Clause, not the Guarantee Clause in Article IV.187 Brennan not-
ed that the political question doctrine was applicable in cases that involved 
the relationships that the federal courts had with other branches of the fed-
eral government, not with the states.188 To explain how the current case 
failed to fit into the political question doctrine, the justice composed a list 
of cases where the political question doctrine would pose a problem, in-
cluding cases that involved foreign relations, dates of duration of hostili-
ties, validity of constitutional amendments, the status of Indian tribes, and 
a republican form of government.189 Because of Frankfurter’s dissent, 
Brennan focused on the republication form of government argument. He 
distinguished Luther v. Borden,190 which had grown out of the Dorr Rebel-
lion in Rhode Island in the 1840s, from the current case, noting that Lu-
ther had been about which government was lawful, not about vote dilution 
as Baker was.191 
In both affirmative and negative ways, Brennan employed various le-
gal doctrines, including those related to subject matter jurisdiction, stand-
ing, and political questions, to achieve the end of allowing the plaintiffs to 
make their case in federal court for vote dilution. Thus, Brennan used the 
law as a means to further an end. 
Second, Brennan called upon the law to promote the moral concept of 
equality in voting. In Baker, urban voters suffered from vote dilution as 
more people had moved to the cities in the six decades since the Tennessee 
Legislature last had reapportioned the state.192 For example, 2,340 citizens 
in Moore County had one state house member, while 55,712 citizens in 
Sullivan County had one state house member.193 Shelby County’s multi-
member delegation had one member for every 39,043 voters, while Gib-
son County’s multi-member delegation had one member for every 14,916 
voters.194 Although Brennan acknowledged that, if the case were about a 
republican form of government, the Guarantee Clause would not help the 
  
186. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
187. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-10. Brennan’s movement from the Guarantee Clause to the Equal 
Protection Clause has been described as an attempt to avoid the appearance of the Court’s departure 
from precedents on nonjusticiability. McConnell, supra note 12, at 106-07. However, this criticism 
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190. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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plaintiffs,195 he instead focused on vote dilution and called upon the Equal 
Protection Clause to conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportuni-
ty to make their case in federal court for equality in voting.196 
Either implicitly or explicitly, Brennan’s opinion provided for several 
types of political equality.197 The opinion assumed equal suffrage, which is 
that everyone would be able to vote.198 While this was not always true in 
the South at the time of Baker,199 Brennan supported the concept as an 
assumption of his main argument. The opinion also provided for equal 
probabilities, which means that, at a theoretical level, each vote would be 
equally likely to shape the results of a given election.200 The focus of the 
opinion was on equal shares, a concept that states that each elected official 
should represent an equal number of voters as another politician.201 This 
focus was the forerunner of the idea of one person, one vote. 
Third, Brennan’s opinion demonstrated how the federal courts could 
help achieve justice regarding equal voting rights. Brennan deftly avoided 
allowing the political question doctrine to prevent the plaintiffs from 
bringing their suit in federal court and instead saw the constitutional dep-
rivation as amenable to judicial correction.202 Brennan drew upon the 
Court’s then-recent opinion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.203 In Gomillion, the 
black plaintiff had lived in Tuskegee, Alabama, until the state legislature 
had redrawn the city boundaries to exclude most of the black residents.204 
The plaintiff had maintained that this government action had denied him 
his right to vote in city elections.205 Noting that the state could not act by 
“‘circumventing a federally protected right,’”206 the Supreme Court had 
held that the state action violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
the right to vote.207  
Rather than letting the state legislature discriminate against members 
of a racial minority group, the Court in Gomillion had situated the state 
action within the reach of the U.S. Constitution and, accordingly, within 
the reach of the federal courts.208 Calling upon this Gomillion precedent in 
  
195. Baker, 369 U.S. at 223. 
196. Id. at 237. 
197. For several types of political equality for which the opinion did not provide, see Guinier & 
Karlan, supra note 13, at 217-18. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 218. 
200. See id. at 217-18. 
201. See id. 
202. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 229. 
203. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Frankfurter had authored the Court’s opinion in Gomillion. Id. at 340. 
Brennan’s use of Frankfurter’s Gomillion opinion to help make the argument against Frankfurter’s 
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204. Baker, 369 U.S. at 229-30. 
205. Id. at 230. 
206. Id. at 231 (quoting Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347). 
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Baker, Brennan constructed a similar voting rights case based on the Four-
teenth Amendment, rather than the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby opening 
the door to the prospect of justice for the plaintiffs at the district court 
level following remand of the case.  
Fourth, Brennan’s opinion reflected a lack of inclination to defer to 
other branches of the federal government. Brennan could have argued, as 
Frankfurter did, that the matter of apportionment was a political question 
and that, under the Guarantee Clause, the matter would have been one for 
Congress to address. Well aware of the argument for the political question 
roadblock, Brennan instead drew a distinction between political questions 
and political cases.209 Brennan noted, “The courts cannot reject as ‘no law 
suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘po-
litical’ exceeds constitutional authority.”210 Touching upon matters related 
to the organization of state government would not turn a matter into a po-
litical question,211 just a matter political in nature. 
Brennan distinguished Luther v. Borden212 from the case at bar so the 
Court would not have to defer to another branch of the federal system. 
Reviewing Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Luther opinion, which had dealt 
with a republican form of government for Rhode Island, Brennan observed 
that Taney had listed several factors that had established a political ques-
tion in Luther.213 The factors had included a commitment to other branches 
of the decision regarding the lawful government of a state, clear presiden-
tial action in recognizing a government, a need for finality in the Presi-
dent’s decision, and a lack of criteria a court could use to determine which 
type of government was republican.214 Since the factors from Luther did 
not cover the matter of diluted voting rights in Baker, the Baker matter 
was outside the area that the federal courts were prohibited from entering. 
The Court did not have to defer to Congress or the President, and Brennan 
was pleased to remand the matter to the federal district court for further 
proceedings. 
Fifth, Brennan adopted a judicially-created test that gave the federal 
courts a great deal of flexibility in assessing whether a case presented a 
political question that would bar federal judicial process in that case. 
Brennan indicated that “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question” would be the following: 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
  
209. Id. at 217. 
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213. Baker, 369 U.S. at 218, 222.  
214. Id. at 222. 
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without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifar-
ious pronouncements by various departments on one question.215 
In the absence of factual satisfaction of at least one of these factors, 
the Court should refrain from dismissing a case on political question 
grounds.216 As noted above, Brennan found factual support for none of the 
factors he listed.217 
The political question factors presented anything but the sharp-
cornered rules that a Holmesian justice would appreciate.218 For instance, 
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department”219 was problematic because the power of 
judicial review allows courts to review most actions of other branches, and 
the Constitution, which does not even reference judicial review, accord-
ingly fails to list exceptions to the federal courts’ power of judicial re-
view.220 The matter of what constituted “judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards”221 was open to a fair amount of interpretation. In con-
stitutional cases, the Court has created a variety of standards to interpret 
nebulous constitutional provisions.222 Indeed, in the apportionment cases 
that followed Baker, the Equal Protection Clause itself, absent judicial 
contribution, offered no standards for evaluating state apportionment 
laws.223 One could make the same vagueness point about whether another 
branch of government should make an initial policy determination.  
The other factors were not any clearer. With regard to whether a court 
might fail to express respect due to another branch of government, the 
federal courts implicitly show disrespect for the other branches of gov-
ernment when the courts strike down legislative and executive actions as 
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unconstitutional, 224 yet judicial review remains a commonly accepted 
power. One might ask when the courts should refrain from questioning a 
political decision. Also, when a court declares the action of another branch 
of government unconstitutional, then two branches of government have 
made different, and thus conflicting, pronouncements on an issue,225 but, 
with judicial review, this phenomenon is well-established. Brennan did not 
clarify these factors. In laying them out, he gave the federal courts a great 
deal of room for maneuvering in the realm of political questions.226 In that 
way, judges’ understandings of the facts and social policies, not of the 
rules, would drive the analyses in future cases. 
These factors were so flexible, in part, because they did not draw up-
on one consistent theoretical perspective; rather they drew upon at least 
three such theoretical perspectives.227 One such perspective is the classical 
theory of political questions, which, as John Marshall articulated in Mar-
bury v. Madison,228 states that a federal court can decide all matters before 
it except those that the Constitution specifically gives to another branch of 
the government to address.229 Another perspective is the prudential theory 
of political questions, which says that a court should avoid deciding the 
merits of a case when doing so would put the court in a position to com-
promise an important principle or undermine the credibility of the court.230 
An additional perspective is the functional theory, which looks at consid-
erations such as a court’s gaining access to relevant information, the need 
for uniformity of decision in an international matter, and the various re-
sponsibilities of other branches of the government.231  
Each of the six factors that Brennan presented reflected a theory of the 
political question doctrine. The first factor, “a textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment,”232 reflected the classical theory.233 The second two factors, “a lack 
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the 
question]” and “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy de-
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termination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,”234 reflected the 
functional theory.235 The final three factors, “the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government,” “an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made,” and “the potential-
ity of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question,”236 reflected the prudential theory.237 By draw-
ing upon at least three theories of the political question doctrine, Bren-
nan’s Baker opinion embodied the flexibility that instrumentalist judges 
desire and provided such flexibility for judges who would be hearing ap-
portionment cases on the merits in the near future. 
Sixth, Brennan worked with an evolving Constitution that met the 
needs of the day. Although Brennan did not admit it,238 specifically to keep 
the Court’s majority together,239 he revised the Court’s understanding of 
Colegrove v. Green,240 the then-recent precedent on apportionment that 
was lingering in the background in Baker.241 In Colegrove, several Illinois 
voters had challenged the apportionment of Illinois congressional dis-
tricts.242 The Supreme Court had upheld the district court’s dismissal of 
the case.243 While the Court had not had a majority opinion,244 the implica-
tion of the result had been that the Constitution did not allow for this type 
of suit in federal court. The other justices who wrote opinions in Baker 
noted Brennan’s rhetorical move. In his concurring opinion in the case, 
Douglas commented that the Court had held in Colegrove that the protec-
tion of voting rights was beyond the attention of the federal judiciary.245 In 
his Baker dissent, Frankfurter explained that the Court’s series of cases 
that included Colegrove had been “overruled or disregarded” with the 
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nan “essentially overruled Colegrove”). 
242. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550. 
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majority opinion in Baker.246 Still, Brennan diplomatically moved from a 
Colegrove-esque understanding of whether the Constitution afforded citi-
zens whose votes were diluted an opportunity to be heard in federal court 
to a Gomillion-esque understanding of that problem. Since Colegrove as 
previously understood did not work, Brennan reshaped the Court’s under-
standing of a federal constitutional right. 
Although tempered to maintain a Court, Brennan’s instrumentalist ju-
dicial philosophy was at work in the Court’s majority opinion in Baker. 
Brennan treated law as a means to an end, used law to advance moral con-
cepts, employed the court system to help achieve justice, refrained from 
deferring to other branches of the government, adopted a judicially-created 
test, and saw the Constitution as an evolving document. This type of judi-
cial philosophy helped to open the door to fairer representation in govern-
ment. 
B.  Frankfurter’s Opinion As Holmesian 
In contrast to Brennan’s instrumentalist opinion, which Frankfurter 
described as “empty rhetoric,”247 Frankfurter’s opinion demonstrated a 
strong Holmesian philosophical approach. Indeed, Holmes himself had 
been a mentor to Frankfurter.248 In his opinion, Frankfurter called upon 
predictable rules and precedent, emphasized the need for rules with sharp 
corners, looked at the purpose behind the law, expressed his belief in the 
limited role of the judiciary, and wanted to defer to another branch of the 
government. This subsection elaborates on the various ingredients in 
Frankfurter’s Holmesian opinion. 
First, Frankfurter called upon predictable rules and precedent to make 
his case. Committed to a case whose plurality opinion he had authored, 
Frankfurter looked to Colegrove v. Green249 for precedent. As noted 
above, Colegrove was the recent Supreme Court case in which Illinois 
voters had challenged the apportionment of their congressional districts, 
and the Supreme Court had upheld the district court’s dismissal of the 
  
246. Id. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
247. Id. at 270. Frankfurter’s use of this term reflects the fact that, at times, rhetoric has been a 
marginalized discursive genre. Throughout Western history, rhetoric has existed “within a dialectic of 
authority and marginality.” Robert Hariman, Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory, 72 Q. J. 
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RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 66 (2d 
ed. 1999). Despite Plato’s critique of rhetoric, “[r]hetoric was the superior art in ancient Rome and 
throughout the Renaissance.” Hariman, supra, at 41.  
248. HIRSCH, supra note 160, at 10. Frankfurter later picked law clerks for Holmes. POWE, supra 
note 6, at 6. 
249. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
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case, 250 which implied that the Constitution did not allow for this type of 
suit in federal court. As Frankfurter saw it, “Colegrove held that a federal 
court should not entertain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to 
adjudicate the constitutionality, under the Equal Protection Clause and 
other federal constitutional and statutory provisions, of a state statute es-
tablishing the respective districts for the State’s election of Representatives 
to the Congress.”251 In Colegrove, Frankfurter had described the problem-
atic area to be judicially avoided as a “political thicket.”252 The dissenting 
justice in Baker believed that the two opinions by the four justices who 
comprised a majority of the seven members of the Court who participated 
in Colegrove were sufficient to establish this legal principle.253 In a series 
of cases since Colegrove, the Supreme Court had heeded the considera-
tions behind the political question doctrine.254 
Additionally, Frankfurter offered his historical understanding as prec-
edent for the idea that representation was not necessarily proportionate to 
the geographic spread of the population.255 He looked to the past of Great 
Britain,256 where, until the nineteenth century, the base of representation 
was the county or borough, from which a set number of representatives 
would be selected, regardless of the population.257 Before the Reform Act 
of 1832, citizens in well-populated northern industrial centers had been 
largely disenfranchised.258 By the 1870s and 1880s, one-quarter of the 
electorate had two-thirds of the members of the House of Commons.259 
Although Parliament made various attempts to distribute its seats by popu-
lation, the problem persisted.260 Frankfurter noted that English judges long 
had been reluctant to become involved in disputes over political power.261 
In the British colonies that later became the United States, a similar 
system of representation based on local government entities such as towns 
or counties developed, even though the British experience “was a model to 
be avoided.”262 “[G]rossly unequal electoral units” were the result.263 
  
250. Id. at 550, 556. 
251. Baker, 369 U.S. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
252. 328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion). 
253. Baker, 369 U.S. at 277-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
254. Id. at 278. 
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257. Baker, 369 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The borough that retained its level of 
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35, at 15-16. 
258. Baker, 369 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
259. Id. at 304. 
260. See id. at 304-07. 
261. Id. at 288 n.21. 
262. Id. at 307. 
263. Id. 
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Since the Constitution did not apportion based on population, the problem 
persisted after the Constitutional Convention.264 Frankfurter noted that, at 
a state level, the problem of disproportionate representation persisted up 
until and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.265 
For good measure, Frankfurter looked at apportionment contempora-
neous with Baker. He observed that only twelve state constitutions provid-
ed for periodic apportionment of both legislative houses, and only about 
another twelve state constitutions called for such reapportionment of one 
house.266 In many cases, legislatures had not reapportioned, despite state 
constitutional requirements to do so.267  
In sum, Frankfurter argued that consistent and longstanding precedent 
existed for non-proportional representation. As he understood the situa-
tion, the case was about “a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a 
different label,”268 and precedent did not allow for judicial relief.269 Frank-
furter described a problem, but he was unwilling to address it via the fed-
eral courts. 
In believing that precedent offered a predictable rule contrary to the 
rule the Court adopted, Frankfurter was not restrained in his assessment of 
the Court’s rhetoric. He described the Court’s shift as “a massive repudia-
tion of the experience of our whole past.”270 By straying from well-
established precedent, the Court was “asserting destructively novel judicial 
power.”271 
Second, if the federal courts were to address the case, which Frankfur-
ter did not support, the dissenting justice expressed a need for rules with 
sharp corners. He noted the difficulty of creating judicial standards for 
addressing reapportionment,272 particularly under the Guarantee Clause.273 
The problem, he argued, was complex and beyond judicial capacity to 
handle; the courts lacked the expertise to work with such a problem.274 
Indeed, “[t]he dominant consideration [was] ‘the lack of satisfactory crite-
ria for a judicial determination.’”275 This was especially so when the ap-
portionment issue was the main issue for a federal court to hear in a 
case.276 
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267. See id. at 320. 
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269. Frankfurter lost the Guarantee Clause argument, but he was not the last person to make a 
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Frankfurter added that adopting the Equal Protection Clause as a 
standard instead of the Guarantee Clause would not help to address the 
problem of judicial standards.277 If reasonableness under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause were a function of the type of government allowed, then the 
Court would have to determine what constituted a republican form of gov-
ernment before determining the issue of equal protection.278 Accordingly, 
in the absence of a clear standard for the courts to apply, the Court should 
not allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their case. 
Despite what Frankfurter wrote, various standards did or soon would 
exist. Options for standards under the Equal Protection Clause included 
substantial equality and absolute equality.279 If it had been created slightly 
earlier, the soon-to-be-famous one person, one vote standard would have 
been an option.280 Also, after Baker and before the Court decided the fac-
tually similar case of Reynolds v. Sims281 two years later, the lower federal 
courts effectively devised and applied their own standards in apportion-
ment cases.282 Focusing his analysis exclusively on the Equal Protection 
Clause regardless of the type of government involved, Frankfurter could 
have adopted or devised one standard or another, but he opted not to do 
so.283 The standards were or could have been available, although, besides 
absolute equality, the standards were not rules with sharp corners. 
Third, Frankfurter examined the purpose behind one of the key mat-
ters at issue in the case. Standing persistently beside the idea that the 
courts should not consider reapportionment cases, Frankfurter pointed out 
that the Framers refused to allow the federal judiciary to remedy every 
social problem.284 Other branches had roles to play in government, too. 
Frankfurter observed, “To charge courts with the task of accommodating 
the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical 
puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judg-
es.”285 Shuddering at the thought of such judicial “omnicompetence,” 
Frankfurter then explained that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution persis-
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285. Id. at 268. 
17
26 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 4 
tently rejected a proposal that embodied this assumption and Thomas Jef-
ferson never entertained it.”286 Because of their limited role in govern-
ment, as Frankfurter understood it, the courts were not the forum for ad-
dressing the reapportionment problem.287 
Fourth, and on a related note, Frankfurter insisted that the role of the 
judiciary was merely to interpret existing law. Quoting Chief Justice 
Taney in Luther v. Borden,288 Frankfurter commented, “‘It is the province 
of a court to expound the law, not to make it.’”289 The dissenting justice 
did not want the judiciary to enter a new area of law and develop new 
principles. In moving into an area where the Court was breaking new 
ground, the Court showed its “[d]isregard of inherent limits in the effec-
tive exercise of the Court’s ‘judicial Power’”290 Frankfurter expressed his 
concern regarding the Court’s authority.291 Such authority was a function 
of “sustained public confidence in [the Court’s] moral sanction.”292 If the 
Court began to make law, as Frankfurter understood the situation, the 
Court would suffer the consequence of reduced public confidence. In dra-
matic fashion, Frankfurter scolded the Court for its action as follows: “It 
implies a sorry confession of judicial impotence in place of a frank ac-
knowledgment that there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy 
for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative 
power.”293 The Court, Frankfurter maintained, had overextended itself.294 
Fifth, Frankfurter emphasized the importance of judicial deference to 
the government in cases of political questions. From past case law, he 
devised a list of matters that would constitute political questions, including 
the following: war and foreign affairs; the structure and organization of 
institutions of the states; and abstract questions regarding political power, 
sovereignty, or government.295 Of note, Frankfurter admitted that the 
Court could act in cases of black disenfranchisement because of the specif-
ic constitutional mandates in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.296  
With this list of political questions in mind, Frankfurter observed that 
Congress should decide the matter of what government was appropriate 
for a state.297 The authority for this principle was the Guarantee Clause.298 
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“The crux of the matter,” Frankfurter maintained, “is that courts are not 
fit instruments of decision where what is essentially at stake is the compo-
sition of those large contests of policy traditionally fought out in non-
judicial forums . . . .”299 If the plaintiffs were to be heard on the merits, 
then Congress would have to decide the matter. 
Frankfurter’s Holmesian judicial philosophy was at work throughout 
an acerbic dissent in Baker. Frankfurter called upon predictable rules and 
precedent, emphasized the need for rules with sharp corners, looked at the 
purpose behind the law, expressed his belief in the limited role of the judi-
ciary, and would have deferred to another branch of the government. This 
type of philosophy would have avoided judicial action to remedy the obvi-
ous problem of malapportionment. 
V.  OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AT WORK IN 
THE OPINIONS OF BRENNAN AND FRANKFURTER 
Overall, the judicial philosophies at work in the Baker opinions exam-
ined here brought several matters to light. For instance, the philosophies 
illustrated the ongoing legal dialectic of change versus tradition. In Baker, 
Brennan saw the very real problem of disproportionate representation and 
used the federal courts to open the door to a legal remedy for that prob-
lem. Instrumentalism was a tool for social improvement. In contrast, 
Frankfurter looked to the past for guidance on how, if at all, to address the 
problem, and, based on tradition, passionately insisted that the courts re-
frain from taking action to remedy the problem. Holmesianism was a tool 
for the status quo. In a system based on precedent, tradition will always 
play a role, but sometimes society needs to move forward. 
On a related note, the philosophies in the opinions dramatized another 
legal dialectic, that of activity versus passivity, particularly with regard to 
the role of courts in the United States.300 As both Brennan for the Court 
and Frankfurter in dissent agreed, some questions are “political” in the 
sense that other branches of government should address them; courts do 
not remedy all wrongs.301 Still, in conversation with the passive virtues302 
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of Holmesianism are the active virtues303 of instrumentalism. As Alexan-
der Hamilton noted, courts are supposed to be “the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments.”304 Hamilton added that the 
judiciary is “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humors in the society.”305 Judicial review, a key tool of the courts, is par-
ticularly appropriate for “unblocking stoppages in the democratic pro-
cess.”306 Seeing a situation that violated basic principles of representative 
democracy307 and recognizing that rurally-dominated legislatures were 
unlikely to address the problems of urban voters,308 Brennan opened the 
door to using the Equal Protection Clause to address the ill humor of 
malapportionment. At the same time, he increased the power of the federal 
judiciary.309 
In this active sense, Brennan’s instrumentalist philosophy helped to 
shape Baker as a classic Footnote Four case.310 As Justice Harlan Stone 
suggested in the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,311 the Court might have to apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in cases in which “legislation . . . re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation.”312 Stone also suggested that a 
more exacting judicial review might be appropriate in cases of “discrete 
and insular minorities,” particularly when the political processes that nor-
mally protect such minorities are curtailed.313 
Directly or indirectly, Baker was relevant to both of these Footnote 
Four concerns. The lack of compliance with the apportionment require-
ment of the Tennessee Constitution severely restricted the way urban vot-
ers could change the composition of the Tennessee Legislature. Indeed, 
the majority of the state population did not have recourse to bring about 
more equitable representation.314 Brennan addressed this problem head on. 
Also, although Brennan did not make an issue of race,315 since 
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malapportioned states gave disproportionately greater representation to 
rural areas that, at least at the ballot box, were generally white,316 
malapportionment sometimes acted as a mask for state-sponsored racism 
against black individuals in the urban areas.317 The disproportionately em-
powered rural white voters were often disinclined to work to remedy black 
disenfranchisement.318 Thus, the normal political process was not able to 
help such “discrete and insular minorities.”319 Brennan opened the door to 
federal judicial action to address the problem of vote dilution in general, 
and that included vote dilution of black Americans.320 
Although Frankfurter was incensed with Brennan’s instrumentalism, 
Brennan was not as active as he might have been. Rather than proceeding 
on the merits, the Court remanded the Baker case to the district court for a 
trial.321 Two years later, in New York Times v. Sullivan,322 another classic 
instrumentalist opinion,323 Brennan not only established at the Supreme 
Court level the legal principle of actual malice under the First Amendment 
to protect the press that was covering the civil rights movement,324 but he 
also applied that standard of actual malice to the facts at hand and came to 
a pro-speaker, anti-public official conclusion on the merits.325 In contrast, 
in Baker, Brennan exercised some caution so as not to lose an important 
vote and jeopardize the future of federal judicial review of apportionment 
issues. He deftly refrained from arriving at an ultimate conclusion, specif-
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ically to retain the vote of Stewart, who would support only jurisdiction 
and not a decision on the merits.326 While somewhat restrained for an in-
strumentalist approach, this approach was not enough to console the dis-
tressed Holmesian Frankfurter.327 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has looked back at how the differing judicial philosophies 
of Justice Brennan and Justice Frankfurter vied to shape the outcome of 
the critical twentieth century Supreme Court case Baker v. Carr. To do 
so, the Article provided an overview of four primary judicial philosophies, 
including instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and natural law, and 
offered background on the Baker case. The Article considered the various 
philosophical ingredients at work in the opinions of Brennan and Frankfur-
ter and made several observations regarding those judicial philosophies in 
the two opinions. 
As Charles Baker and the other plaintiffs saw the matter, at stake was 
the value of each citizen’s vote based on where in the state he or she hap-
pened to live. In focusing on change and activity, Brennan’s opinion for 
the majority, guided by instrumentalist principles, opened the door to a 
future that looked very different from the present that the Court confront-
ed. In focusing on tradition and passivity, Frankfurter’s dissent, guided by 
Holmesian principles, would have retained the malapportionment of the 
status quo, at best suggesting that Congress consider the problem. Despite 
Frankfurter’s adamant protests,328 the Court and the country moved for-
ward. By the 1962 election, only a few months after the Court’s Baker 
decision, Georgia and Maryland each had reapportioned one state house, 
and Tennessee and Alabama each had reapportioned both state houses.329 
Other states soon would follow. If that progress had not happened, Chief 
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Justice Warren would have lacked the opportunity to claim credibly that 
Baker was “the most important case” of his time on the Supreme Court.330  
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